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This report describes how the philosophy that influenced Anti-Submarine
Warfare operations can be used to guide counterforce attacks against
mobile missiles. It explains why an ASW approach to counterforce is
superior to just attacking an opponent's missile infrastructure. It also
explains why this type of counterforce strategy can be based on
preemption not preventive war. The impact of ASW counterforce
operations are also evaluated in terms of the stability-instability






As events during Operation Desert Storm demonstrated, Theater
Missile Defense (TMD) will be increasingly important to the United States
in the future. From a strictly operational perspective, U.S. forces
stationed overseas would greatly benefit from a capability to defend
themselves and their hosts against ballistic missiles, especially if an
opponent's delivery systems are armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD). But, from a political or strategic perspective, TMD could be the
sine qua non of U.S. intervention in a regional conflict. If American forces
lack a credible TMD capability, U.S. allies might come to believe that it is
in their interest to reach an accommodation with aggressive regional
powers, they could decide to bandwagon instead of balancing in the face of
aggression.'' Indeed, this is the primary concern that motivates U.S.
counterproliferation efforts: by obtaining a WMD capability, a state
contemplating even conventional aggression could reduce U.S. regional
influence. 2 American policymakers might be willing to take the chance
that a carrier battle group on the move cannot be targeted, but regional
allies might not be willing to count solely on deterrence to protect
stationary countervalue targets (population, resources or industry) from
attack.
In a sense, TMD creates a sort of "chicken and egg" problem for
strategists. On the one hand, allies are probably necessary for the
construction of a credible Theater Missile Defense, especially if their
propinquity to the threat increases the usefulness of their territory in the
construction of missile defenses. On the other hand, TMD strategies that
require allied participation must find a way to secure this cooperation;
they must explain why the allies needed to stage an effective defense will
be available at the proper time. TMD plans that simply assume allied
cooperation in this most dangerous game are simply "preferred strategy."
In this case, architects of U.S. TMD assume that allied powers will join
U.S. initiatives despite the best efforts of potential opponents to prevent
this cooperation. After all, this was an important lesson of the Gulf War:
Saddam Hussein worked to destroy the political glue of the coalition
arrayed against him by attempting to draw Israel into the fray.
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Policymakers should not assume that overwhelming U.S. military
superiority will again rescue the United States from a politically difficult
position. 4 Clearly, there is a political foundation to TMD that must be
created prior to the eruption of a regional crisis involving the potential
use of theater missiles. To assume otherwise would only complicate a
politically and militarily dangerous situation.
Another lesson from the Gulf War is that effective TMD requires
both a counterforce capability and a counterforce strategy. Despite the
availability of the Patriot missile system, U.S. planners seemed to give
little thought to the mobile-missile threat before the Gulf War. This lack
of attention could be explained by the fact that the SCUD threat itself
does not fit easily into the notion of the ideal strategic air campaign. 5
Most strategists would probably agree that hunting individual SCUD launch
teams in the field is an inefficient use of scarce resources. 6 Yet, as the
war demonstrated, ignoring this problem in peacetime only increases the
need for wartime innovation. Although they did not pose a significant
military threat, SCUD attacks during the war posed an enormous political
problem for the alliance. Despite the protests of planners, SCUD attacks
ultimately forced the alliance to alter significantly the air campaign.
Indeed, as General Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff noted, "what
surprised us was we put three times the effort that we thought we would
on this job. "7 Peacetime planners can concentrate on the rational
application of air power; but, in wartime, political concerns will work to
concentrate every available military asset to stop missile attacks against
countervalue targets.
Given the need for the United States to develop an effective TMD
strategy to bolster allies in the face of regional aggression, the purpose
of this article is twofold. First, the analysis will briefly describe an
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) approach to the counterforce mission
inherent in any realistic effort to defend U.S. allies and U.S. forces
stationed overseas from attacks from mobile missiles. This approach
offers a new philosophy about how to prosecute counterforce attacks
against mobile missiles, a philosophy based upon the Navy's many years of
experience hunting submarines operating at sea. Second, this article will
explain how TMD, especially a defensive strategy that incorporates an
ASW-based counterforce capability, can bolster America's political and
military position by strengthening regional alliances. In other words, a
counterforce strategy that reflects ASW procedures is both politically and
militarily superior to other counterforce strategies because it is based on
preemption and not on preventive war or retaliation. An ASW-inspired
counterforce strategy would serve to bolster deterrent and denial
strategies that require allied participation; but, it probably would not
further exacerbate potential regional confrontations that are by definition
crisis unstable.
The analysis begins by describing the "ASW approach" to
counterforce. It describes the five-step method the Navy devised to
conduct undersea warfare and how this approach can be used to guide a
counterforce campaign directed against mobile missiles. It then states
why counterforce is crucial to any TMD strategy. It describes how
counterforce -- the need to base TMD on a strategy of preventive war or
preemption -- can complicate the use of TMD to strengthen regional
alliances. The article also explains why a counterforce strategy governed
by an ASW philosophy can overcome many of the problems inherent in
engaging in TMD counterforce attacks. The analysis concludes by
discussing how this proposed counterforce strategy can help achieve U.S.
political and military objectives.
An ASW Approach to Counterforce
The effort to target a weapons system that relies on mobility and
stealth to avoid destruction is a problem that has long confronted the U.S.
Navy. Submarines rely on their ability to move quietly throughout the
world's oceans as a defense against attack. At first glance, it would seem
far easier to find a needle in a hay stack than to find a submarine in the
oceans' vast expanse. But, the U.S. Navy has developed a highly
sophisticated ASW capability that literally can detect, track, target and
destroy submarines as they operate in the open oceans. In theory, the
same ASW philosophy used to organize and prosecute attacks against
submarines should prove to be equally effective against mobile missile
that also rely on mobility and stealth for protection.
The U.S. Navy's ASW procedures are often divided into five
categories: (1) the continuous collection and analysis of intelligence on
all known platforms; (2) continuous monitoring of all probable launch
areas; (3) generation of cueing (warning) when specific platforms move to
a launch status; (4) the localization of specific systems; and (5) attack.
Organized sequentially, each of these categories represents a stage in the
ASW search and attack effort. As one moves from stage one to stage five
not only does the area searched become increasingly restricted, but the
time available to complete the task at hand becomes increasingly limited.
These five stages should be replicated in the effort to destroy mobile
missiles; they can form the core elements of an ASW approach to
counterforce strikes against theater ballistic missiles.
The Five-Step SCUD Hunt
A great deal of information, critical to the entire counterforce
effort, can be gained through sustained collection and analysis of data
about all known mobile missiles, the first stage of the ASW process. In
tracking submarines, the opponent's entire inventory is followed by hull
number; similar efforts would have to be made to track individual missile
Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs). Missile production, storage and
repair centers would have to be continuously monitored to generate this
fundamental order-of-battle intelligence. This should yield information
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about the overall size, day-to-day readiness, and surge (alert-generation)
capability of the opponent's systems. Training cycles, exercises, support
vehicle activity, base egress and ingress and movement through "choke
points" (well-maintained roads, heavy duty bridges, rail heads) would also
be continuously monitored. Not only would these efforts yield a useful
estimate of the general location of the opponent's mobile missiles, but it
would also create a baseline to assess deviation in the opponent's
standard operating procedures. In effect, stage one creates an indications
and warning baseline, a critical component of the overall military and
political success of counterforce TMD strategies.
Surveillance of all probable launch areas, the second step in the ASW
process, depends upon intelligence initially gathered about the opponent's
overall missile capability: indications of when and where to look for
mobile missiles are produced in stage one analyses. In stage two
operations, visual signatures of areas of interest would be compared on a
regular bases to look for changes (damage to plants, tire tracks or the
presence of the weapons systems themselves). Similarly, acoustic,
seismic, radar and communication signatures could be used to develop
records that could be compared over time. Of special importance would be
"life-support events," the logistical tail that might lead directly to a TEL
in the field or evidence of human activity as the TEL crew goes about its
daily business. Special attention would be paid to the most likely
operating areas and negative search information (indications that terrain
features make certain areas unsuitable for SCUD operations) would be
used to develop an operating history of the opponent's TELs. Armed with
this information, real-time "tracks" of fielded TELs could be maintained
as long as possible; thus, a working knowledge of the location of all TELs
in or near launch areas could be maintained.
Cueing, the third step in the ASW process, is characterized by
intensive efforts to develop a more accurate and detailed track of a
specific weapons system. It typically results when the TELs presence is
detected in a launch area or when changes in activities or activity levels
indicate that preparations are underway for an actual missile launch. This
intelligence could come from a variety of sources. Stage one analyses
might yield indications of changes in activity patterns or the general
location of a specific system. Stage two surveillance efforts might also
detect communication, acoustic or radiation signatures as TELs are made
ready to fire. Cueing, however, is best viewed as a transitional step in
counterforce efforts against mobile missiles: it is related to a decision by
either U.S. authorities or the opponent to begin to move to a war footing.
Cueing is intended to establish a detailed track of a potential target,
information that would allow for the quick prosecution of an attack.
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The decision to engage in the localization (identification of the
target's precise location) of cued TELs, the fourth stage of the
counterforce operation, will likely be made by the National Command
Authority. Although search activities related to cueing might require
overflights of an opponent's territory, localization will require armed
aircraft or unmanned airborne vehicles to enter an opponent's airspace, an
act of war. Platforms working to localize an opponent's TELs should
themselves be armed with defense suppression weapons. Localization
begins from a starting point identified by intelligence collected and
analyzed from the proceeding three stages of the ASW process; because of
the short ranges involved, a wide variety of sensors can then be used to
generate timely and detailed tracks of the target. Obviously, coordination
of the platforms involved and fusion (receiving, analyzing and displaying)
of the data produced by a variety of sensors would facilitate localization.
Over the years, the Navy also has discovered that practice is the
critical element in the success of localization efforts. The Navy was
fortunate, however, in the sense that the Soviets had for years provided
opportunities to localize real targets on the open ocean. In other words,
officers and policymakers cannot expect that the skills, experience,
hardware and communication architectures (fusion) necessary to localize
a target can be improvised at a moment's notice.
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The final step in the ASW process is to attack the target. Ideally,
the attacking weapons system would have its own localization sensor.
The Navy never carried out this final step during the Cold War, but
exercises revealed that coordination and practice did increase the
likelihood of successful attacks. It would also be important during an
attack to verify somehow that the opponent's weapons system had been
destroyed: crippled systems could be repaired and fired at a later date.
In sum, several aspects of an ASW approach to counterforce make it
attractive as a framework for the destruction of TELs before missile
launch. An ASW approach calls for continuous monitoring of the status
and activities of an opponent's military forces. This would not only build
order-of-battle and infrastructure intelligence, but it would also provide
a basis for indications and warning estimates. An ASW approach also
increases the defensive problem confronted by the opponent. Instead of
counting on the ability to "shoot and scoot," opponents would have to base
their operations on the assumption that their forces are being
continuously hunted. In a situation when every stray electronic, seismic
or acoustic emission might be used to attack a TEL, missile crews might
become preoccupied with the defensive task of protecting their missiles.
It might become impossible for them to fire with the "hunters" on their
trail. Moreover, because it does not rely on "flaming datum," an actual
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missile firing, to locate an opponent's weapon, an ASW inspired strategy
probably is the most effective approach to counterforce. It is the only
strategy that suggests that it is possible to locate and to destroy
missiles after they have moved to the field but before they can be fired.
Still, one facet of the ASW approach makes it especially attractive
as an organizing framework for the counterforce mission: an ASW
approach to counterforce allows for the possibility of preemption. In
other words, the decision to begin the final stages of the counterforce
mission — localization and attack — can be made after strategic warning
has been received. Because monitoring is continuous, the decision to
destroy an opponent's weapons can be based on indications that the
opponent is preparing its mobile missile systems for launch. As the
following sections explain, this single characteristic of the ASW approach
to Theater Missile Defense increases its political attractiveness as the
basis of a counterforce strategy. Policymakers can wait very late in the
game, in fact, even after the initiation of conventional hostilities, before
taking action to destroy an opponent's capability to use mobile missiles to
launch Weapons of Mass Destruction.
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Theater Missile Defense: A Simple Formula
As one long-time student of strategy was fond of noting, there is no
secret to damage limitation. Three capabilities are required. First, a
good counter-force capability must be available to destroy weapons on the
ground before they can be launched against U.S. allies or U.S. forces
stationed overseas. Second, active defenses must be used to engage the
forces that survive initial counterforce attacks. Third, passive defenses,
programs to reduce the vulnerability of likely targets to the effects of the
opponent's weapons, must be available. 9 Technological, organizational and
strategic shortcomings or even the opponent's own defensive efforts can
limit the effectiveness of damage limitation strategies. 10 But, when
combined, these three capabilities can create a denial strategy, a plan to
prevent the opponent from obtaining his objectives.
Counter-force strategies — efforts to destroy delivery systems,
missile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), storage and maintenance
facilities and operating bases — contribute enormously to the overall
effectiveness of Theater Missile Defenses. Compared to the active and
passive defensive missions embodied in TMD, counterforce strikes are
particularly efficient. In other words, counterforce attacks make it
possible to destroy groups of weapons and delivery systems with
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individual weapons; conversely, active defenses generally require the
expenditure of several weapons to stop or destroy individual warheads.
Two reasons can be offered for the relative effectiveness of
counterforce. First, it is often easier to locate and attack a weapon
before it is put into operation or is actually fired; and, as just noted,
counterforce is efficient at the margins. Compared to active defense,
counterforce strikes pose a relatively modest technological targeting
problem. Not only are the targets often stationary, but their whereabouts
can usually be determined in advance. In other words, it is easier to
target operating and storage facilities than it is to destroy missile
warheads traveling toward a target at thousands of miles per hour.
Because they are relatively large and may be located prior to hostilities,
fixed targets are more easily destroyed than individual weapons on the
move. Of course, surprise is probably necessary to gain all of the
advantages inherent in counterforce attacks. It is likely that competent
opponents faced with a brewing crisis would use dispersal, active
defenses or even the shield provided by moving weapons into civilian
population centers to protect critical systems from attack. 1 1
Counterforce attacks can be more efficient than active defenses
because they hold out the prospect of destroying dozens of delivery
systems or warheads with relatively few weapons: weapons expenditure
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rates favor counterforce in most circumstances. For instance, it is easier
to destroy ten warheads sitting on a missile in its silo than to destroy
individually ten warheads as they speed toward their targets. Indeed, as
one follows a weapons system's infrastructure from individual warhead to
production facilities, counterforce's "efficiency at the margins," becomes
readily apparent. As the Air Staff has noted: "(the] earliest response
offers greatest leverage at [the] lowest cost. "12 By attacking a TEL and
its missile reloads, one could destroy forty warheads (four missiles
carrying ten warheads) with as little as one weapon. Similarly, it might
be possible to destroy dozens of missiles by attacking assembly-fueling-
mating facilities or to destroy hundreds of delivery vehicles by attacking
storage facilities. By holding out the prospect of destroying dozens, if not
hundreds, of individual weapons simultaneously, counterforce is the most
efficient component of a Theater Missile Defense effort.
There is one factor, however, that can limit the overall
effectiveness of counterforce strategies. To be successful, counterforce
requires a state to take the initiative; generally speaking, the earlier in a
conflict the decision is made to exercise the counterforce option the
greater its potential impact. Counterforce strategies face diminishing
returns as a war progresses. For example, an opponent's forces can be
dispersed, making them more difficult to locate and destroy. Weapons can
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also be placed on alert; given tactical warning, many can be used rather
than face destruction on the ground. Of course, some benefits can always
be obtained by destroying empty garrisons or a nation's general military
and industrial infrastructure, but once an opponent's forces move to a war
footing, counterforce strikes will produce diminishing returns. To insure
the greatest effectiveness, TMD requires the initiation of counterforce
strikes as early as possible in a developing conflict. Clearly, the
requirement to initiate counterforce attacks before opponents launch
their weapons could undermine both deterrence and crisis stability, but it
is possible to mitigate the more provocative elements of TMD.
If policymakers consider realistically the fundamental limitation of
counterforce strategies -- the need to fire first — they are really left
with two options: a state can initiate hostilities either by launching
preventive or preemptive attacks. The decision to launch a preventive war
often rests on the calculation that war is inevitable, and that conditions
will never be more favorable for the initiation of hostilities. In a sense,
leaders who adopt the logic of preventive war are risk acceptant; they are
willing to jump through "windows of opportunity."^ They tend to believe
that since they must fight an opponent sooner or later, they may as well
fight now before changes in the military, diplomatic, domestic-political
or economic balance decrease the chances for success on the battlefield.
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Although the eruption of WWI and even Hitler's declaration of war on the
United States have been identified as cases of preventive war, the best
example of the phenomenon probably is the Japanese decision to attack
Pearl Harbor. 14
By contrast, preemption occurs following indications that the
opponent is about to attack. A preemptive strategy implies that a state is
not willing to allow its opponent to inflict the first blow; upon receipt of
strategic warning, the goal is simply to beat the opponent to the punch.
Although preemption lacks the onerous political and moral connotations
that are inherent in plans for preventive war, it still is a demanding
military mission. According to Lawrence Freedman, "the technical
requirements [of preemptive war] would be exacting: a reliable
intelligence system, to insure adequate warning of attack, and an ability,
including a capacity for quick movement, to abort this attack."15 a
preemptive attack would be prompted not by the normal day-to-day
operating procedures followed by an opponent, but by clear indications
that the opponent's forces are either being placed on generated alert or
are actually being readied for firing. Some analysts believe that both
Soviet and American officers and policymakers were mesmerized by the
effort to avoid falling victim to the other's preemptive nuclear attack,
leading both Superpowers to create nuclear employment doctrine and
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command and control infrastructures that were inherently crisis
unstable. 16 But, the best recent example of a preemptive attack was the
1967 Israeli strike against both Egypt and Syria after Israeli military and
political leaders became convinced that the Arabs were about to initiate
hostilities.'' 7
In sum, TMD would greatly benefit from the integration of
counterforce strikes into an overall strategy to defend against missile
attack. To be most effective, however, a state contemplating
counterforce attacks must be willing to initiate hostilities. Moral,
political and practical considerations, however, argue against the
adoption of a preventive war strategy. Put succinctly, as a democracy, the
United States cannot adopt a strategy of preventive war, even though the
strategy has been considered in times of perceived great peril. 18
Preemption is demanding, but it is the only real form that U.S.
counterforce attacks can take. Indeed, those who advocate a preventive
war strategy for the United States must first explain why American
political leaders will behave differently in the future; after all, now is
the time for preventive war to stop WMD proliferation to places like Iran
and North Korea.
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TMD and Regional Alliances
Given the nature of potential conflicts, one could add a fourth
element to a new U.S. TMD strategy: strong alliances, or at least extremely
cooperative working relationships with new-found friends. Counterforce
strikes would be facilitated by access to bases close to an aggressive
state. Similarly, active defenses, especially point defenses, might be
impossible to construct without access to territory near or around likely
targets. The very existence of alliances themselves also strengthens the
credibility of U.S. deterrent threats: alliances provide tangible evidence of
a U.S. commitment to defend a state or a region against aggression. But
the role played by strong alliances in a successful TMD strategy does not
mean that they will exist when the time comes. The cooperation and
protection of allies is both a means and an end of U.S. strategy. In other
words, allies might be necessary for the construction of TMD, but the
availability of an effective TMD might also be a necessary condition for
the creation of a strong regional alliance to resist an aggressive state.
Because U.S. TMD strategy is linked to regional alliances, planners
must take into account the political and military motivations of potential
U.S. allies. For most regional actors, the overriding goal of their foreign
and defense policies will be to avoid an opponent's missile attacks.
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Fundamentally, they have two options to achieve this objective: (1) they
can enter into an alliance (balance) with the United States to prevent the
attack either through a denial strategy based on TMD or a deterrence
strategy based on retaliation; or (2) they can reach some political
accommodation (bandwagon) with the threatening state to avoid attack.
The challenge for U.S. planners is to devise a TMD strategy that increases
the likelihood that potential allies will balance instead of bandwagon.
Without this kind of strategy, the proliferation of WMD could reduce U.S.
regional influence: potentially friendly states might become unwilling to
support U.S. policies generally or to assist U.S. efforts to stop aggressive
states.
A TMD strategy based on the notion of preventive war is unlikely to
deter bandwagoning behavior for several reasons. Given the goal of
avoiding missile attacks, preventive war could be viewed as a sure fire
way to bring about undesired conflict. All things being equal, regional
actors will probably be willing to let sleeping dogs lie in the hopes that
continued diplomatic efforts or unanticipated developments will remove a
nascent threat. Almost by definition, the real prospect of preventive war
will appear far more harrowing and undesirable than the seemingly remote
possibility of missile attacks. A preventive war strategy simply offers to
fight more efficiently a war that regional elites wish to avoid in the first
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place. As a result, it is unlikely to elicit a positive response from
friendly regimes.
A strategy of preemption, however, is more likely to serve as a
rallying point for regional actors. Democratic allies would be attracted to
the prospect of avoiding hostilities until the last possible moment by
simply planning on beating the opponent to the punch. In contrast to a
preventive war strategy, preemption offers the hope of winning or, at a
minimum, greatly reducing the consequences of a war that is already
unfolding. A preemptive strategy holds out the possibility of delaying the
onset of war until the last possible moment, until an opponent begins to
undertake activities identified as evidence of immediate preparations for
an actual attack. Diplomatic initiatives intended to prevent war can thus
be allowed to run their course. Obviously, this would help the formation
of a coalition of democratic states; the case for engaging in hostilities
would develop naturally as diplomatic efforts repeatedly fail to generate
a positive response from the opponent. 19
Most importantly, if a U.S. led coalition adopted a preemptive TMD
strategy, it still might not have to initiate hostilities. The first shot in a
war does not necessarily have to be fired by the United States in a TMD
counterforce attack. Counterforce strikes against an opponent's missile
infrastructure and launch facilities could be withheld until indications
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were received that the opponent was making actual preparations to fire.
Indeed, a finely tuned preemptive strategy would give the United States
and its allies an enormous advantage. For example, everything from border
skirmishes to large-scale conventional war could take place without
placing irresistible pressure on the United States to escalate vertically
the conflict by attacking the opponent's missile systems and
infrastructure. Even after hostilities had erupted, counterforce attacks
could await clear indications that the opponent was preparing missile
systems for immediate firing. In effect, if U.S. policymakers believe that
the United States and its allies must obtain the political benefits that
accrue to clear-cut victims of aggression, then TMD counterforce attacks
would have to be based on preemptive strategy that employs ASW
techniques.
Similarly, TMD counterforce could also prevent the opponent from
benefiting from the stability-instability paradox. 20 An opponent might
believe that the threat of missile attack, especially if these missiles
were armed with weapons of mass destruction, could reduce the U.S.
presence in a region or prevent a vigorous U.S. or allied response to
hostilities. An opponent could be counting on the stability produced by the
possibility of missile attacks to pave the way for conventional aggression
(instability). Indeed, this is one way a state contemplating aggression
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could attempt to take advantage of either the honest efforts of most
states to avoid war, or the tendency of small states to bandwagon in the
face of particularly dangerous threats. The leadership of an aggressive
state would hope that the threat of missile attack would pave the way for
conquest, not only without interference from extra-regional actors, but
maybe without any bloodshed at all ^ 1
An ASW-inspired TMD defense, however, could help reduce some of
the more dangerous aspects of the stability-instability paradox.
Threatened states in a region could take measures to improve their
defenses, despite threats of missile attack, because the option of TMD
would be available. And since a TMD based on an ASW philosophy does not
require a preventive war strategy, regional allies or new-found friends
would not have to view a decision to strengthen their defenses as a
decision for war. This is the most vicious aspect of the stability-
instability paradox: leaders contemplating aggression will hope that their
intended victim will come to believe that any sort of decision to resist
aggression actually increases the likelihood of bringing about the
undesired outcome, war. A counterforce strategy based on ASW
techniques, however, separates the decision to create a defense from the
decision to engage in war. The notion that the decision to construct a
defense is not a prelude to war will increase the likelihood that
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policymakers will work to deploy theater defenses before a nascent
crisis.
Even a preemptive strategy based on an ASW philosophy, however,
can never completely eliminate fears of "miscalculated escalation," fears
that lie at the heart of the stability-instability paradox. In other words,
U.S. and allied policymakers will always fear that actions taken to
increase their defensive capabilities might be seen by their opponents as
a sign of impending attack, leading the other side to preempt in a crisis
that otherwise might be solved peacefully.22 indeed, the fear of
miscalculated escalation is what distinguished risk-averse policymakers,
who hope to avoid war, from risk-acceptant leaders who are willing to
generate "a few casualties" to achieve their objectives. Ultimately, the
decision to risk war by increasing one's defenses is a political issue that
lies beyond the reach of strategy.
Still, one could argue that regardless of what philosophy influences
a TMD counterforce architecture, denial strategies are inherently crisis
unstable. Opponents will not stand idly by and allow the United States to
build an effective TMD that eliminates their capability to launch either
conventional or WMD warheads against their opponents. In other words, a
denial strategy creates more than just a "use it or lose it situation" for
an opponent; it could also indicate to targeted states that the United
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States and its allies are contemplating aggression or preventive war.
Under these circumstances, TMD counterforce will simply accelerate and
intensify the security dilemma (military actions taken for even defensive
purposes tend to decrease the security of others), leading to a further
deterioration in regional politics or even war.23 Alternatively, a denial
strategy could make it clear to leaders contemplating aggression that the
costs of war could not be avoided and that they alone will not dictate the
tempo of escalation or the scope of the conflict; these kinds of
perceptions tend to strengthen deterrence.24
It is unlikely, however, that an ASW-inspired counterforce strategy
will have much impact on crisis stability in the most probable regional
contingencies because the nuclear and conventional military balance in
these regions is extremely crisis unstable. Although American
policymakers do not dwell on the fact, the United States already
possesses a splendid nuclear first-strike capability against regional
mobile missile threats. It might be apparent to Americans that it is
unlikely in the extreme that the United States would initiate nuclear
hostilities, but regional opponents must plan to meet U.S. capabilities, not
U.S. intentions. Until regional actors obtain a significant secure second-
strike WMD capability against the United States, the nuclear and
conventional military balance, in a strict "technical" sense, will remain
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crisis unstable, regardless of the refinements the United States makes to
counterforce strategies. And, in the political sense of the term,
underlying hostility, alternate views of history, and competing political
agendas will only serve to fuel regional competition. Clearly, the states
involved believe that war is a real possibility; this perception alone
greatly contributes to crisis instability. 2 5
Conclusion: TMD Counterforce & Alliances
A preemptive counterforce strategy that is influenced by an ASW
philosophy offers important advantages over other approaches to the
counterforce mission that must be a part of any realistic Theater Missile
Defense plan. An ASW approach to counterforce makes a preemptive
strategy possible. A preemptive strategy, in turn, makes it more likely
that U.S. efforts to defend against regional missile attacks will generate
regional support. Instead of reducing U.S. influence in a region, Theater
Missile Defenses based on an ASW philosophy are more likely to be
supported by allies. The preemptive strategy outlined in this article can
increase the probability that the political prerequisites of military
success will be in place when the United States confronts aggressive
states armed with ballistic missiles. In other words, a counterforce
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strategy based on ASW principles can increase the probability that
regional actors will balance with the United States against aggressive
states. An ASW approach to counterforce could strengthen deterrence by
helping to create the alliances needed to demonstrate an American
commitment to resist aggression.
To guarantee both the political (bolster U.S. regional influence and
allies) and military (destroy missiles before they are launched) success of
an ASW counterforce strategy, however, three processes have to be set in
motion well before the onset of hostilities. First, weapons systems and
intelligence collection facilities must be either created or modified to
meet the requirements of posed by the ASW counterforce mission. Second,
discussions must take place with potential allies about the Theater
Missile Defenses as soon as possible. Not only would this be taken as a
sign of U.S. support, helping to achieve the political goal of boosting U.S.
influence in a region threatened by missile attack, but it would also serve
as the basis for future military cooperation. Clearly, key issues related
to intelligence collaboration and the sharing of military facilities would
have to be solved before a simmering conflict becomes a crisis. But, most
importantly, political and military judgments will have to be made in
advance about what constitutes strategic and tactical warning of
impending missile attack. Sorting out these issues during a crisis is
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likely to produce paralysis as allied policymakers and officers come to
terms with the demands of a preemptive strategy. During the Cold War, for
example, analysts called attention to the political problems the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would face in responding to
indications of impending attack.26 Analysts noted that fears of
miscalculated escalation, defections from the alliance, or just political
indecision could impede NATO's response to Soviet mobilization. If one
considers that NATO's membership had years to contemplate how and when
to generate its defenses upon receipt of indications and warning of attack,
the severity of the problem facing a nascent alliance that has adopted a
preemptive strategy is clear. Extensive consultations about when and how
to respond to an opponent's generation of its mobile missiles must take
place before the onset of a crisis; consultations represent a necessary
condition for the success of any counterforce strategy based on
preemption.
Since much of the political benefit of an ASW inspired counterforce
strategy is based on its requirement of sustained and intensive political
and military interaction with potential allies, the need for these kinds of
consultations should be viewed as a positive development. Even though
unilateral action might offer a simpler way of dealing with nascent
missile threats, a multilateral response, by definition, would probably be
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more politically productive from the American perspective. And, since a
multilateral response is likely to serve as a strong political signal of a
coalition's willingness to resist attack, political, military and
intelligence consultations on the issue of missile defense might serve to
deter states contemplating aggression.
Third, from a strictly practical standpoint ASW counterforce
operations cannot be improvised at the last minute. If the Navy's
experience is any guide to this type of operation, then the hunt for mobile
missiles will succeed only after much practice. 27 Indeed, over the years,
the Navy discovered that ASW operations required that a community of
officers dedicate major portions of their careers to this specialized form
of warfare. In a time of shrinking resources, however, the challenge
would be to develop an interservice community dedicated to the task of
destroying mobile missiles on the ground. Indeed, each of the services
have something to contribute to an ASW counterforce effort. Not only
would a massive amount of air power be required to complete these
attacks successfully, but ground forces could also play a part in
conducting reconnaissance missions, especially by guaranteeing that
missiles once localized and attacked were actually destroyed.
Ultimately, technology might improve the effectiveness of
counterforce attacks, but it is impossible to predict when, during a period
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of decreasing defense budgets, this new technology will become available.
Still, an ASW approach to organizing a counterforce attack offers a cheap
and politically and militarily effective way of destroying mobile missiles.
The solution to the SCUD problem, a solution likely to meet with the
approval of America's allies, is available today. Senior political and
military officials simply need to recognize the potential inherent in an
ASW approach to counterforce to make this capability a reality for the
United States, its allies, and U.S. forces operating overseas.
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